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Foreword 
The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was inaugurated by the Na-val War College in 1901 as a forum for essays, treatises and articles that pro-
mote a broader understanding of international law. The eighty-fourth volume of 
this historic series, International Law and Military Operations, is a compilation of 
scholarly papers and remarks der ived from the proceedings of a June 2007 confer-
ence hosted by the Naval War College. 
The purpose of the conference was to address three areas of interest- law of the 
sea and maritime security, the law of anned conflict and coalition operations, and 
the 2006 Lebanon Conflict. Participants came to Newport from twenty-five coun-
tries and included government officials. military commanders. representatives of 
non-governmental organizations, esteemed intemationallaw scholars, and military 
and civilian lawyers. The conference was designed to encourage a constructive dia-
logue on these issues by examining US and international perspectives to ensure a 
sensible development of the law, and to preserve both national and collective security 
imperatives. Undoubtedly the ideas generated in this "Blue Book" volume will con-
tribute substantially to the ongoing examination of the major legal challenges ac-
companying mari time operations and armed conflict in the twenty-ftrst century. 
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend a warm thank-you to Major Michael D. 
Carsten, US Mar ine Corps, under whose leadership this conference was o rganized, 
and who served as the editor of this volume. I also wish to thank the authors for 
their invaluable contributions to this work and for engendering a greater under-
standing of operational law in the maritime context and of the law of armed con-
flict generally. Thanks also to the Lieber Society of the American Society of 
International Law, cosponsorofthis conference. And, ftnally, a very special note of 
gratitude goes to the Naval War College Foundation, Roger Williams School of 
Law and Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, whose tremendous support made this 
conference, and, particularly, this International Law Studies volume, possible. 
JACOB L. SHUFORD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy 
President, Naval War College 

Introduction 
Since its founding in 1884, the US Naval War College has been committed to the study and teaching of the law impacting military operations. As part of its 
commitment, from June 20-22, 2007 the Naval War College hosted a conference 
entitled lntertlational LAw and Military Operations. Initiated in 1990, with a confer-
ence addressing the targeting of enemy merchant shipping, the international law 
conference series brings together internat ional scholars and practitioners, experts 
in military operations and students to examine topical legal issues. Commencing 
with that inaugural colloquium, the proceedings of and papers from each succeed-
ing conference have been published as a volwne of the Naval War College's inter-
nationally acclaimed International Law Studies (" Blue Book") series. This "Blue 
Book" continues that practice. 
The conference speakers explored several diverse, yet timely, subjects relevant 
to the planning and conduct of military operations. These include maritime strat-
egy and the global legal order, the law of the sea and maritime security, the law of 
armed conflict, maritime enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, coalition operations, and the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. This volume of the 
International Law Studies series is a compilation of remarks made during the con-
ference and of articles that expand upon the thoughts articulated during the 
conference. 
The conference was organized by Major Michael D. Carsten, US Marine Corps, 
of the International Law Department, who also served as managing editor of this 
volume. The conference was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of 
Armed Conflict of the American Societyof lnternational Law, and was madepossi-
ble through the support of the Naval War College Foundation, Roger Williams 
University School of Law and the Israel Yearbook on HI/man Rights. Without the 
dedicated efforts, support and assistance of these individuals and organizations the 
conference would not have taken place. 
I once again give thanks to Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain 
Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), who undertook the lion's share of the edit-
ing p rocess. Indeed, this edition marks the sixth consecutive "Blue Book" on which 
they have shared editing responsibili ties. Without their tireless efforts and devo-
tion to the Naval War College and to the International Law Studies series, this pub-
lication would not have been possible. 
Special thanks go to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, President of the Naval War 
College, and Professor Barney Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare 
Studies, for their leadership and support in the planning and conduct of the con-
ference, and the publication of this volume. 
The International Law Studies series is published by the Naval War College and 
distributed worldwide to US and international military organizations, academic 
institutions and libraries. This" Blue Book" and its predecessors evidence the Naval 
War College's long-standing dedication to the scholarly discourse and understand-
ing oflegal issues at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 
DENNIS L. MANDSAGER 
Professor of Law & Chairman 
International Law Department 
x 
Preface 
I mmediately following the conclusion of the conference, Commander Eric HUft, JAGC, US Naval Reserve, an officer assigned to the reserve unit support-
ing the International Law Department, expertly prepared a conference summary 
which captures the highlights of the presentation of each of the conference speak-
ers. The remarks that follow are, with limited editing to conform to the "Blue 
Book" style, that swnmary. My thanks are extended to Commander Hurt for this 
outstanding work; it certainly eased my work as editor. 
I also extend my thanks and appreciation to Susan Meyer afthe Desktop Pub-
lishing Office here at the Naval War College. Ms. Meyer has been responsible for 
preparation of the page proofs of eight volumes of the International Law Studies 
series. The high quality of this volwne is again testimony to her professionalism 
and outstanding expertise. My thanks also go to Me. Albert Fassbender and Ms. 
Shannon Cole, two superb proofreaders, who are Ms. Meyer's colleagues in the 
Desktop Publishing Office. The "final" article that left the International Law De-
partment was a far superior article when it returned fro m that office. 
I encourage readers of this volume to first read the following summary. It will 
whet your appetite for the individual articles prepared by the speakers and their in-
sightful analyses of many of the challenging international law issues facing mili tary 
forces today. 
Keynote Address 
In his address opening the conference, Professor Allen reflected that three decades 
have elapsed since law of the sea scholar Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged con-
ventional thinking with his book Tile Influence of Law on Sea Power. O'Connell 
wrote that the law of the sea is the stimulus to sea power and that future naval op-
erations planning staffs must acquire an appreciation of the law. Professor Allen 
used this groundbreaking book as the backdrop for a discussion of the develop-
ment of the new maritime strategy of the United States. During the summer of 
2006, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked the Naval War College with developing 
ideas that will guide the team charged with crafting the new maritime strategy. The 
new strategy will be nested within the security strategies which emanate from the 
National Security Strategy of the United States. This is not the first time the US 
Navy has launched a grand strategy development project, but common to all of the 
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predecessor documents is a lack of express discussion of the role of law and legal in-
stitutions in naval operations. 
This unanimous agreement on the need to reference international law arises 
from the role of law as an ordering force. Order is necessary for successful trade, 
transportation and the interaction of nations pursuing their national interests. 
Professor Allen observed that the rule sets which bring about this order will not al-
ways be voluntarily complied with and that, for that, enforcement must be added. 
This enforcement requires new ways of thinking. The historical "DIME" construct 
of diplomatic, information, mili tary and economic methods of engagement must 
be supplemented by law enforcement, judicial and cultural measures. To achieve 
these goals within a maritime strategy, Professor Allen advanced the idea that law, 
as a proven promoter of order, security and prosperity, can be a powerful unifying 
theme. Law provides the language and logic of cooperation. It is clear that respect 
for international law and our recognition of such will allow the United States to 
shape the global and legal orders as a good -faith participant in the system. 
Panel I - Law of the Sea and Maritime Security 
Rear Admiral Horace B. Robertson Jr., JAGC, US Navy (Ret. ), Judge Advocate 
General of the United States Navy from 1974 to 1976, opened the panel by provid-
ing a historical background for the US position on the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention ). The United States, as early 
as 1966, under President Johnson proclaimed that the seas must not be the source 
of a land grab. This position was reinforced by President Nixon's 1970 call fora sea-
bed treaty. In 1982, then-President Reagan announced the US opposition to the 
1982 LOS Convention, citing the machinery of implementation. President Reagan 
detailed his specific objections to the treaty. In the time since these objections were 
registered, they have all been addressed. Despite these remedies, opposition to US 
accession to the Convention persists. 
Rear Admiral Robertson outlined the continuing objections to the 1982 LOS 
Convention. These objections all appear to be ideological and lack substance. Chief 
among the opposition's arguments is that a ratification of the Convention is a sur-
render of US sovereignty to the United Nations. This is not supported by the text of 
the document or the machinery used to administer the Convention. Opponents 
also claim that the United States need not ratify UNCLOS, as customary interna-
tional law provides all of the same benefits. While customary international law 
does set forth a legal framework, it does not provide the precision of UNCLOS or 
the institutions by which to seek resolution of disputes. 
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The Staff Judge Advocate for United States Pacific Command, Captain Raul 
(Pete) Pedrozo, JAGC, US Navy, observed that there are many challenges to free 
navigation of the seas. These challenges include regimes adopted by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), such as establishment of mandatory ship re-
porting systems and particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSA). These IMO measures 
have the practical effect of impeding freedom of navigation in designated portions 
of the ocean. Captain Pedrozo indicated that the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) has requested the designation of over 140,000 
square miles of ocean surrounding the Northwest Hawaiian Islands as a PSSA. 
Such a designation, in his view, is not necessary and will pose significant challenges 
for the US Coast Guard and NOAA to enforcement of the mandatory ship report-
ing system that will encircle the PSSA. The proliferation oflMO-adopted measures 
could also adversely impact the operations of the US Navy worldwide. 
The Judge Advocate General for the United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral 
William Baumgartner, US Coast Guard, spoke on the increasing importance of 
conditions on port entry as a tool for ensuring maritime security and the need for 
an analytical structure to evaluate proposed entry conditions. Given the impor-
tance of port security, the Coast Guard has developed a comprehensive strategy to 
combat maritime terrorism called Maritime Sentinel which takes a three-pronged 
approach: 1) achieving maritime domain awareness, 2) undertaking effective mar-
itime security and response operations, and 3) creating and overseeing an effective 
maritime security regime. Conditions on port entry, such as advanced notice of ar-
rival for commercial vessels arriving from abroad, are and will continue to be an 
important part of executing this strategy. 
Rear Admiral Baumgartner noted that additional conditions may be added in 
the future and suggested that the following questions should be asked in evaluating 
those conditions: 
• Will the proposed condition be effective in addressing an issue of significant 
importance? 
• Is there a better, less expensive and less objectionable way to accomplish the 
same policy goal? 
• w ill it be consistent with customary and conventional international law of 
the sea, i.e., does it impinge on important navigational freedoms? 
• Does it have a rational nexus in time, place and purpose to the actual entry 
into port? 
The goal of enhancing national security is most effectively met by stopping threats 
before they reach our shores. Conditions on port entry are one of the most effective 
tools in accomplishing this but they must be prudent and well considered. 
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Professor Guifang (Julia) Xue of Ocean University of China observed that 
China is moving from being a State historically focused on coastal State interests to 
becoming a maritime State. This move results from China's growth as a major 
influencer of globalization . The importance of free navigation, as reflected in the 
1982 LOS Convention, has caused a reevaluation of China's laws and policies. This 
reevaluation takes the fo rm of modifying Chinese domestic law to come into com-
pliance with the Convention and working to settle tensions between China and 
various States, such as Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam. 
Luncheon Address 
Rear Admiral Schachte began by outlining how opponents of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention have dealt in misrepresentations to defeat its approval by the US Senate. 
These misrepresentations center mainly on the argument that the Convention will 
rob the United States of its sovereignty. In fact, there is nothing in the treaty which 
takes away from the maritime power of the United States. Opponents also claim 
the Convention will serve as a threat to US freedom of navigation on the high seas. 
With over one hundred illegal claims against navigation, the 1982 LOS Convention 
stands as the mechanism which will allow for greater freedom of navigation and the 
resolution of impediments to movement. 
The Convention provides a stable legal environment which improves the US 
ability to succeed in the Global War on Terror. Despite claims to the contrary, the 
Convention does not give the United Nations the authority to tax the United States 
or to board US ships. Accession to the 1982 LOS Convention would give the 
United States the ability to shape and influence world maritime policy and law. 
With President Bush's endorsement of the Convention and a large number of sen-
ators indicating support, Rear Admiral Schachte expressed hope that the Senate 
will soon provide its advice and consent, but stressed that party or non-party, a robust 
freedom of navigation program must continue to be a part of US oceans policy. 
Panel n - Law of A nned Conflict 
Professor Yoram Dinstein , Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, spoke on di-
rect participation of civilians in hostili ties and targeted killings in the context of re-
cent decisions by the Supreme Court of Israel. The principle of distinction-
between civilians and combatants, as well as civilian objects and military objec-
tives-is the most basic principle of the international law of armed conflict. Profes-
sor Dinstein noted that the defmition of military objectives (grounded on nature, 
location, purpose or use) is very open ended, since every civil object-including a 
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hospital or a church-is liable to be used by the enemy, thereby turning into a mili-
tary objective. Hence, the key element in practice is the requirement of proportion-
ality, meaning that-when a military objective is attacked-incidental injuries to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects m ust not be excessive in relation to the an-
ticipated military advantage gained. Of course, what is considered excessive is of-
ten a subjective assessment made in the mind of the beholder, subject only to a test 
of reasonableness. 
On the subject of direct participation of civilians in hostilities, Professor Dinstein 
observed that there is a virtual consensus that, at those times when the direct partici-
pation is occurring, the individual may be targeted. But what is he in terms of clas-
sification? Professor Dinstein believes that the person has become a combatant, 
and indeed (more often than not) an unlawful combatant. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (1CRC), on the other hand, adheres to the view that he re-
mains a civilian (although agreeing that he may be attacked while directly 
participating in hostilities). The difference of opinion has a practical consequence 
only when the person is captured. Professor Dinstein takes the position that, as an 
unlawful combatant, the person loses the general protection of the Geneva Con-
ventions and only benefits from some minimal standards of protection, whereas 
the ICRC maintains that the general protection of civilian detainees under Geneva 
Convention IV remains in effect. 
Professor Dinstein also addressed the issue of human shields. When a civilian is 
voluntarily attempting to shield a military objective from attack, he is directly par-
ticipating in hostilities. As for the involuntary use of civilians to shield military ob-
jectives, the act is unlawful and even (under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court) a war crime. But what if involuntary human shields are used? 
Does it mean that the principle of proportionality remains intact, so that the op-
posing belligerent may be barred from attacking the military objective? This is the 
position taken by Additional Protocol I of 1977. Professor Dinstein disagrees. In 
his opinion, under customary international law, the principle of proportionality 
must be stretched in such an instance and applied with greater flexibility. If the 
outcome is that a large number of civilians are killed, their blood is on the hands of 
the belligerent party that abused them as human shields. 
Doctor Nils Melzer, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stressed 
that in the current conflict against terrorism, there is no defined battlefield. This 
leads to confusion in distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Civilians 
enjoy protection under intemationallaw until such time as they participate in hos-
tilities. Unfortunately, there is no clarity on what it means to participate. An ICRCI 
Asser Institute initiative on direct participation seeks to define the term "direct 
participation" in the context of the concept of civilians, the nature of hostilities and 
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the modalities of the suspension of hostilities. He defined direct participation in 
hostili ties as action taken by an individual which is designed to have an adverse ef-
fect on the military operations of a party. 
Doctor Melzer indicated that the duration of this participation is also difficult to 
quantify. Concrete steps toward the preparation of a hostile act, deployment to 
commit the act, commission of the act and return from deployment are all consid-
ered by the JCRC to be part of the hostile act, and cause civilians to lose their pro-
tection under international law. Once these actions are complete, the civilians 
regain their protected status and are not lawfully subject to attack. As with all com-
bat actions, proportionality must factor into the targeting decision involving the 
civilian engaged in the commission of a hostile act. Ultimately, if there is anyques-
tion concerning the status of a civilian, the presumption must be that the individ-
ual is protected and not subject to lawful targeting. 
Professor David Turns of the University of Liverpool detailed the recent House 
of Lords decision in the case of AI-Skeini. This case involved the deaths of one Iraqi 
civilian while in Bri tish military custody, and five others during British military op-
erations on the streets of Basra. The House of Lords held that an inquiry should be 
held into the death of a prisoner in custody in Iraq in certain extraordinary circum-
stances. Such an inquiry is appropriate when the person is within the jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom for purposes of British human rights law. This is a fact-
specific determination that centers upon whether the individual is in British cus-
tody. In this case, the death of the individual who was in British custody requires an 
inquiry under the law. In situations where individuals are killed and not in British 
custody, they are not within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for human 
rights law purposes, and therefore there is no requirement for an inquiry. In effect, 
when the British Army deploys to a foreign country, it takes with it British human 
rights law which must be applied to those under its control and custody. 
In closing, Professor Turns noted that the United Kingdom's legal view of the 
British presence in Iraq is similar to the position taken with regard to the presence 
of British forces in Northern Ireland during the "Troubles.» In both cases, the Brit-
ish military was invited to aid the existing government and quell unrest; therefore 
detainees are not prisoners of war under Geneva Convention III, because the con-
flict is not a war. Professor Turns concluded by arguing that no matter how the 
Global War on Terror is classifi ed, detainees should be treated either as prisoners of 
war under Geneva Convention III or in accordance with Common Article 3 of the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and be given the maximum benefit of such 
treatment. 
Ashley Deeks from the Legal Adviser's Office at the US Department of State ex-
plained that the United States has engaged in a detailed, ongoing analysis of the 
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rules pertaining to the treatment and classification of detainees. The rules and poli-
cies regarding detainees that the United States put in place in 2002 have evolved 
considerably, due to input from all three branches of the US government. Under 
the present regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the detention of in-
dividuals is the subject of constant and ongoing review. The United States has 
taken concrete steps to ensure that detainees are treated appropriately and that 
their statuses and ongoing detention are reviewed periodically. 
Ms. Deeks noted that the situation in Afghanistan is complicated, given the 
makeup of the coalition involved in operations. Different members of the coalition 
have different domestic laws and policies concerning detainees. In addition, differ-
ent countries are signatories to different law of war and human rights treaties. 
These factors, combined with the difficult-to-classify nature of the operation, 
make detainee operations challenging. Despite these challenges, the United States 
has achieved a sustainable detainee regime in Afghanistan. 
Panel III - New Developments in Maritime Enforcement 
of UN Security Council Resolutions 
Professor Alfred Soons, University of Utrecht, opened this panel by raising the ques-
tion of who may enforce UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).ln short, may 
a non-flag State take action against a vessel outside the national waters of that State? 
The answer depends on the nature of the Security Council resolution. These resolu-
tions cover many areas, including economic sanctions, counterterrorism, counter-
proliferation and peacekeeping. The interpretation of these resolutions can be 
undertaken by Security Council--established sanctions committees, UN member 
States, domestic courts and international tribunals. When interpreting these reso-
lutions it is important to note that the UNSCRs are not governed by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties because the resolutions are not treaties. The in-
terpretation must be driven by looking to customary international law and the 
general principles of law on interpretation. Given the special nature ofUNSCRs, it 
is also helpful to look at the statements of Security Council members in passing the 
resolution and the prior resolutions and practices of the Council. 
Nevertheless, as UNSCRs often involve a potential for incursion into national 
sovereignty, it is important to take a narrow approach to interpreting the resolu-
tion. This may lessen the possibility of an incursion upon sovereignty. If there is 
significant doubt about the meaning or intent of a UNSCR and its application to 
particular circumstances, the proper action to take would be to return to the Secu-
rity Council and ask for a determination as to whether a breach has occurred. 
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Professor Soons closed by stating that when action is taken in a State's territorial 
waters, the UNSCR must state explicitly that force is allowed . 
Professor Robin Churchill, University of Dundee, Scotland, focused on poten-
tial conflicts between UNSCRs and the 1982 LOS Convention. It is clear that 
UNSCRs may routinely interfere with navigational rights reflected in the Conven-
tion. This interference may arise from activities occurring during the enforcement 
of economic sanctions, prevention of trafficking in weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) technology and the prevention of terrorism. These conflicts take place 
when the Security Council, through a resolution, places limits on what a State may 
do upon the seas. 
Professor Churchill then turned to the question of resolving conflicts between 
Security Council resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention. He observed that pur-
suant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, UNSCRs will always prevail over provisions 
of that or any other international agreement. When conflicts do occur, Professor 
Churchill argued that they may be resolved by one of the various dispute settle-
ment bodies, previously chosen by the parties to the dispute under Article 287 of 
the LOS Convention. Of course, these decisions bind only the parties to the dispute 
and the rulings have no precedential value. Finally, these dispute resolution bodies 
may decide the dispute but they have no authority to declare that a UN Security 
Council resolution is invalid. 
University of Central Lancashire Professor Dr. Keyuan Zou observed that China 
is taking domestic action to comply with international non-proliferation standards 
and regimes. Force in support of these regimes should be as limited as possible and 
should be used only when explicitly authorized. Professor Keyuan noted that the 
1982 LOS Convention has no provision authorizing the use of force and therefore 
principles of humanity must be used to resolve conflicts. If force is considered, it 
must be as narrow a use as possible. In fact, before force may be authorized, it can 
be argued that the UN Security Council resolution must specifically reference Arti-
cle 42 of the UN Charter. The use of force in a maritime matter is a law enforce-
ment action, the scope and nature of which must also be controlled by customary 
international law, rules of engagement and an analysis as to proportionality and 
necessity. These considerations are all secondary to the consideration of the sanc-
tity of human life and the need to preserve it. 
Panel N - Coalition Operations 
Brigadier General Ken Watkin, the Judge Advocate General of Canadian Forces, 
began by noting that the Global War on Terror is referred to in Canada as the Cam-
paign Against Terrorism. One of the challenges for nations involved in coalition 
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operations is reaching agreement as to the nature of the conflict. This includes the 
question of whether you can have an international conflict against non-State ac-
tors. lnternational law was designed with the idea that two State actors would be in-
volved in a conflict; however, the majority of contemporary conflicts are internal to 
a State. At a minimum, there appears to be a consensus that Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions would apply to conflicts such as Afghanistan. Addi-
tionally, other treaties will be applicable, but not all coalition partners are bound 
by the same treaties. For example, Canada and many other nations are bound by 
Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while the United 
States is not a party to that treaty. Although AP I does not apply as a matter oflaw to 
most conflicts, it is integrated into the doctrine of Canadian Forces. This has not 
presented any significant problems. 
Unlike some nations, Canada recognizes the concept of "unlawful combatant." 
In examining standards of treatment of unlawful combatants, it is important to 
rely on both customary international and "black letter" law. 
Different legal obligations and approaches sometimes cause friction within co-
alition operations. This can occur in the area of targeting; however, those perceived 
differences may not be that great. Canada and the United Stateshaveslightlydiffer-
ent definitions as to what constitutes a military object. The Canadian definition 
uses AP I wording and does not incorporate the "war sustaining capability" that 
the United States brings within its definition. Generally, however, the difference is 
potentially quite small since Canada, like many other AP I nations, is of the view 
that in considering proportionality the military advantage to conducting an attack 
must be considered as a whole and not be limited to individual attacks. 
When disagreements arise within a coalition, they must be resolved or the ob-
jecting party will not be able to participate in the targeting mission. On other is-
sues, such as the anti-personnel mine Ottawa Convention, problems rarely arise. 
This is due to the fact that even though most NATO members are signatories and 
the United States is not, the nature of operations does not lend itself to consider-
ation of the use of the non-command-detonated anti-personnel mines governed 
by that treaty. 
Next, the Director General, Australian Defence Forces Legal Services, Commo-
dore Vicki McConachie, underscored the importance of close coordination among 
coalition partners. This coordination results from the fad that coalition partners 
may not all be signatories to the same treaties regarding international law and the 
treatment of prisoners. In situations where the partners are signatories to the same 
convention or treaty, they may still have different interpretations of their obliga-
tions. These differences must be quiddy addressed. Accommodation of the various 
partners' responsibilities under both international law and their own domestic 
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laws is necessary to maintain a coalition. The nature of the current global conflict 
has created a number of uncertainties. Before the attacks of9/ l l, there was some 
certainty as to which parts of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions the United States did not accept. Post-9/1 1 there is less certainty on this issue, 
calling for a greater need to coordinate on the proper application of the concepts 
contained in Additional Protocol I. 
Despite these uncertainties, Commodore McConachie feels the United States is 
still able to reach accord on important issues such as targeting and the applicable 
rules of engagement. In the event a specific operation violates a coalition partner's 
legal obligations there must be an "opt out" provision. This provision allows coali-
tion partners to continue their participation in the overall coalition, while not par-
ticipating in operations which violate their legal obligations. These obligations can 
be either international or domestic, as Australian forces are subject to all Australian 
domestic law while deployed in support of coalition operations. 
Captain Neil Brown, of the Royal Navy Legal Services, observed that for coali-
tions to work well there can be no barriers to communication, and that includes the 
sharing of intelligence. The key approach of stafflegal advisers in mission planning 
is to identify, minimize and thereafter to manage different national legal positions. 
In planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and despite distinct national positions on 
the jus ad bellum, this collaborative approach all but eliminated substantive differ-
ences between the United States and the United Kingdom on the application of in-
ternational humanitarian law (IHl). The United Kingdom certainly found during 
the prosecution of the campaign that IHL was entirely appropriate for modern 
conventional warfare. The fac t that US and UK forces operated throughout under 
their own national targeting directives and rules of engagement was not important. 
Of much greater significance was the fact that they were applying, in almost every 
respect, the same law. Some issues were more difficult to resolve, such as the 
United Kingdom's treaty obligations in relation to anti-personnellandmines used 
in the "victim-initiated mode," but in the context of the high-intensity warfighting 
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (March-May2003) none were insurmountable. 
In relation to prisoners of war, internees and detainees, a common position on 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV en-
sured maximum scope for a coalition approach to the prisoners of war, including 
their transfer between coalition partners. Although different national approaches 
were initially taken on the use of lethal force against escaping enemy prisoners of 
war, a coalition position was agreed which required guards to take into account 
whether the scale and character of any escape represented an imminent threat to 
life. Coalition positions in 2003 were developed to reflect Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV requirements, such as the 
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expedited screening process in advance of Article 5 procedures to detennine status. 
The coalition position was more difficult to sustain when, although United Nations 
Security Council resolutions maintained the "imperative reasons of security" pro-
vision of Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV to intern, some commanders pressed 
for a wider approach based on the requirement to gather intelligence. 
The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Ronald 
Reed, USAF, concluded the panel with an approach to coordinating coalition 
operations. This coordination is designed to reduce the incidental friction that 
arises between partners. Understanding that this friction is inevitable, he indicated 
that as much pre-contingency planning as possible should take place. The planning 
must ensure that operations are based upon defined international law. To the ex-
tent possible, rules of engagement should be developed that seek to reconcile part-
ner differences. Identifying pre-contingency coalition forces to react to and deal 
with certain situations allows for a more efficient deployment of forces . The pre-
contingency planning is not a binding set of rules; rather, it is a framework or start-
ing point for dealing with the specifics of certain contingencies. 
Once forces are deployed and the coalition is actively engaged, it is imperative 
that, if multiple rules of engagement are in use, adjacent forces are briefed on and 
made aware of what those contain. As the coalition begins operations, other inci-
dental friction will arise. This has occurred recently when a coalition partner's do-
mestic courts conducted investigations of battlefield incidents and then sought to 
exercise jurisdiction over US soldiers. The United States opposed this, thereby cre-
ating incidental friction. While friction will always be present, all possible steps 
must be taken to minimize it, since legal friction can adversely impact coalition 
cohesion. 
Panel V - Lebanon Conflict 
Professor Michael Schmitt, who held the Stockton Chair of International Law at 
the Naval War College during academic year 2007-08, began the panel with a re-
view of the historical events leading up to the 2006 Lebanon conflict. These events 
included elections in which Hezbollah gained positions in the Lebanese govern-
ment; the capture of Israeli soldiers; and rocket attacks launched against northern 
Israel. The actions of Hezbollah culminated with the Israeli government sending 
military forces into southern Lebanon. 
Professor Schmitt then began the evaluation ofIsrael's actions in the context of 
international law. Israel announced that it was commencing attacks pursuant to a 
right of self-defense against Hezbollah under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As a 
precursor to the question of self-defense, it is important to determine the status of 
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the attacks against Israel. A UN inquiry into the growing conflict found that 
Hezbollah was part of the government of Lebanon and should be treated as a mili-
tia under Article 4 ofthe Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War. Lebanon disclaimed afflliation with Hezbollah and stated that 
Hezbollah was acting independently of the State of Lebanon. 
Professor Schmitt noted that the current state of international law on what con-
stitutes State action by a group is in flux. Under the Nicaragua decision of the Inter-
national Court oflustice (ICn, fo r a group's actions to be attributed to a State, the 
State must control and sponsor the group. This decision has been much criticized 
and does not appear to be consistent with current world reality. Hezbollah was 
present in the government of Lebanon; it at times had some support from govern-
ment organs and was in control of much of southern Lebanon. So, while the Leba-
nese government may not have officially sponsored or controlled Hezbollah, there 
were significant ties between the State and Hezbollah. 
Assuming that Hezbollah was not a State actor fo r purposes of the attacks on 
Lebanon, it is clear from the Caroline case that non-State actors are capable of 
armed attacks against States. In fact, 9/ 11 illustrated that non-State actors are capa-
ble of devastating attacks. This was recognized by the world community through its 
support of the US attacks on the Taliban following 9/1 1. 
Israel was justified in its attacks regardless of the classification of Hezbollah. 
While there is some IC) precedent suggesting Israel could not invoke Article 51 ab-
sent an attack by a State actor, this position is weak. Article 51 makes no mention of 
State action as a prerequisite to self-defense and, as the UN Security Council reso-
lutions following 9/11 demonstrate, attacks triggering Article 51 need not be made 
by a State actor. 
Professor Dinstein indicated Israel's action could be classified as extraterritorial 
law enforcement. Much like the facts of the Caroline case, Hezbollah was acting 
from within Lebanon, Israel asked Lebanon to police its borders in order to pre-
vent Hezbollah's actions, and Lebanon either could not or would not stop 
Hezbollah, the result being that Israel undertook the policing action itself. States 
have an obligation to police their territory or risk having their sovereignty violated. 
Evaluating Israel 's self-defense in terms of necessity, immediacy and proportional-
ity shows that Israel's response was appropriate. Israel's action was necessary and 
immediate, as it was under direct attack. Finally, as to proportionality, Israel's op-
erations were tied to defensive measures to protect itself from rocket attacks by 
Hezbollah. 
Sarah Leah Whitson of Human Rights Watch advised that Human Rights 
Watch had sent teams of investigators to Lebanon both during and following the 
conflict. These investigators conducted numerous interviews of members of the 
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local population, and of representatives of the Israel Defense Forces, Lebanese gov-
ernment, Hezbollah, humanitarian agencies, journalists, hospitals and local offi-
cials. The findings of this investigation will be set out in three pending reports 
examining Israel's and Hezbollah's conduct. The investigation revealed very few 
instances ofHezbollah using the local population as shields for its attacks on IsraeL 
In addition, very few of Hezbollah's rocket-launching sites and munitions and 
arms storage facilities were in dose proximity to civilian objects. Thus, there were 
few Hezbollah actions which resulted in civilian deaths. 
Colonel Pnina Sharvit-Baruh, Head, International Law Department, Israel De-
fense Forces, outlined the Lebanon conflict from the Israeli perspective. It was dear 
from intelligence obtained that Hezbollah was making every effort to blend in with 
the civilian population. This blending ignored the distinction between civilians 
and combatants, and resulted in Hezbollah's shielding its military activities with 
civilians. Israel went to great lengths to limit civilian casualties. Targeting decisions 
were made so as to always attempt to leave one road open for civilian evacuation. 
Also, certain dual-use infrastructure was not targeted because it would have had a 
disproportionate impact upon the civilian population. 
Colonel Sharvit-Baruh noted that there were civilian casualties. These casualties 
were not excessive given the expected military benefit of most of the targets. Tar-
geting was taken very seriously and decisions were made based upon a proportion-
ality review. These decisions were difficult given the nature of the asymmetrical 
warfare involved while fighting a non-State actor that does not comply with the law 
of armed conflict. 
Conclusion 
In dosing, it is our sincere desire that the works of the preeminent practitioners, 
scholars and leaders who contributed so graciously to this volume assist those seek-
ing answers to today's hard questions and propagate thoughts and action that 
shape the course of the future. 
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